A recent beauty contest among seven countries ranked the Dutch health care system first, above Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. 1 When looking into the magic mirror on the wall, the Dutch system came out as the fairest of all, based on equity (first), access (first), quality (second), efficiency (third), and long, healthy and productive lives (fourth). As we know from the fairy tale, the wonderful mirror could speak nothing but the truth. However, the fairy tale also teaches that beauty is transient and that the beauty may even turn into a beast. An interesting question, therefore, is whether the 2006 reform of the Dutch health care system contributed to the beauty of the health care system, or whether it is leading to its deterioration. Did the introduction of regulated competition between insurers within a universal mandatory private health insurance scheme improve the system's performance, or is it gradually eroding equity and resulting in cost inflation?
In 2009, an early evaluation of the new Health Insurance Act was reported. 2, 3 Although it is too early for a definitive verdict because the reforms are still in progress, several conclusions can be drawn. The main focus of the reforms has been on transforming the health insurance market to combine competition and incentives for efficiency while maintaining or even enhancing equity. In this respect, the reforms have been clearly successful. Since 2006, the dual system of mandatory public insurance (for about two-thirds of the population) and voluntary private insurance has been replaced by mandatory private health insurance for everyone. Dutch citizens are required to pay an income-related contribution to a Risk Equalization Fund, covering 50 percent of total expenditure, and a community-rated premium to their chosen health insurer. In addition, two-thirds of Dutch households receive a monthly income-related allowance from the government to make community-rated premiums affordable. A recent OECD study found that the share of out-of-pocket expenses in total health care expenditure in the Netherlands was the lowest of all 29 OECD countries. 4 Moreover, the OECD study also concludes that inequalities in health status tend to be relatively low in the three countries with mandatory health insurance systems with competing health insurers and community-rated premiums (Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland). According to the OECD this may indicate that regulation and risk equalization schemes can help mitigate cream-skimming and the effects of other market mechanisms which can raise equity concerns. Indeed, the sophisticated risk equalization scheme between insurers, which has been developed over the past 15 years to prevent any one insurer facing unsustainable losses due to an excess of high risk enrolees, is playing a crucial role in making cross subsidies between risk groups sustainable in a competitive health insurance market. 5 The Dutch reforms show that it is possible to combine competition and equity in regulated health insurance markets.
Nevertheless, the evaluation of the Health Insurance Act also includes a warning that it is too soon to cry victory, since the current risk equalization scheme still has serious deficiencies, implying that health insurers can easily identify risk groups that generate predictable losses after equalization. Hence, health insurers may still be tempted to discourage unfavorable risks from enrolling. So far, there is no substantial evidence for risk selection, though an increasing share of the elderly and high risk individuals tend to believe they will not be accepted for supplementary insurance. 6 Perhaps more important is that an imperfect risk equalization scheme may affect long-term investment decisions by health insurers, which may result in diverting resources away from care for unprofitable clients to care for profitable ones. Such a subtle form of risk selection may be difficult to detect. To prevent this, further improvements of the risk equalization scheme are necessary and are indeed actively supported by the Dutch government.
Although adequate risk equalization is crucial for creating a level playing field for health insurers, competition among insurers is of limited value if health insurers do not or cannot influence the price and quality of care. So a key question is whether insurers will take up the role of purchasing agent on behalf of their enrollees. Here the evidence is much less clear. On the one hand, health insurers have been effective in enforcing substantially lower prices for generic drugs. 7 Despite an increasing number of users, in 2009, total expenditure on outpatient prescription drugs declined for the first time, by 1.2%. 8 In addition, health insurers also restrained prices for those hospital services no longer regulated by the government. 9 On the other hand, health insurers seem to have had no influence on the quality of hospital services 10 and have not been able to counteract increasing incentives for supplier-induced demand. 11 So far, health insurers have been reluctant to engage in selective contracting with providers or to become actively involved in managing care. An important reason for this is that insurers fear a loss of reputation, since consumers do not trust them to select providers committed to providing good quality care rather than saving money. 12 To ensure credibility, health insurers increasingly use publicly available quality indicators to designate preferred hospitals for certain procedures. As a result, public attention is shifting from selective contracting by health insurers to identify poorly performing hospitals. Recently, a major health insurer terminated contracts with four hospitals for performing breast cancer surgery because the number of operations was too low to guarantee sufficient quality. Nine hospitals were designated as the best hospitals in this area. Within a few days two other major insurers announced a similar policy. Because the national association of patients reacted positively, acknowledging this type of selective contracting as encouraging better quality, this might become a trend.
Another reason for the limited role of health insurers as purchasing agents is that the provider market is still quite heavily regulated by the government. This substantially restricts the ability of health insurers to differentiate provider contracts. Although the room for negotiating prices and other contractual conditions has been gradually expanded, the remuneration of GPs, medical specialists and pharmacies, as well as the prices of many hospital services, are still largely determined by the government. The reluctance of the Dutch government to reduce price regulation can be partly explained by the fear that health insurers do not have sufficient power to negotiate lower prices and counteract supplier-induced demand. A second explanation for the government's reluctance to give up regulation is that it offers more likelihood that health care expenditure will be effectively controlled. Although effective competition is likely to result in lower unit costs, it might simultaneously result in higher total costs due to higher levels of quantity and quality. If so, it is questionable whether society will be willing and able to pay these higher costs collectively from public funds.
Thus even if the regulated competition reform in the Netherlands turns out to be the fairest of all, it will not produce a 'magic bullet' that can avoid critical choices for society about which health services should be paid for collectively and which individually. 
